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Abstract—This paper exposes some weaknesses of encrypted 
embedded memory in secure chips. Smartcards and secure 
microcontrollers are designed to protect confidential internal 
information. For that they widely employ on-chip memory 
encryption. Usually both data and address buses are encrypted 
to prevent microprobing attacks. This paper shows how 
practical such attacks can be on real chips and whether 
memory encryption is as good as it is supposed to be. It was 
possible to extract the whole memory from a secure 8-bit 
microcontroller with as little as 8 probing needles. This paper 
questions the usual belief in that ion-doping-encoded and 
encrypted Mask ROM is ultimately secure. Implications for 
16-bit and 32-bit microcontrollers are discussed as well. Some 
common weaknesses are exposed and possible 
countermeasures are discussed. 
Keywords-microprobing attacks; glitching attacks; memory 
encryption; ROM; EEPROM; Flash memory 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Modern semiconductor devices are expected to safeguard 
the secret information against extraction and modification. In 
the late 90s memory encryption was used primarily for 
PayTV smartcards. Today not only do most smartcards 
employ memory encryption but some microcontrollers use 
encryption for on-chip or embedded memory. 
Microprobing attacks were known for a long time since 
their practicality was demonstrated on PayTV smartcards 
[1]. Second-hand equipment necessary for carrying out such 
attacks is widely available at affordable cost from second-
hand resellers including Ebay. However, chip manufacturers 
have significantly improved chip designs to protect against 
such attacks. Most smartcards now have top layer sensing 
mesh which if disturbed with laser cutter or microprobing 
needle will trigger self-destruction of internal memory 
making the chip no longer functional. However, even that 
protection can be defeated with relatively low-cost 
approaches [2]. 
Secure chips usually do not employ bootloaders to 
prevent non-invasive attacks on Mask ROM [3]. Some 
secure chips have their internal bus encrypted to thwart 
invasive microprobing by making all captured data useless to 
the attacker. Defeating that kind of protection is far more 
challenging. First, because neither the algorithm nor the key 
location are known. Second, because the access to 
unencrypted information is buried deep inside the logic. 
Even partial reverse engineering is unlikely to help because 
modern chips no longer employ block structures with nicely 
laid out bus lines. The logic design usually look as a sea of 
gates with bus lines scattered across the whole chip. Full 
reverse engineering of the logic will be too expensive and a 
time consuming process. On-chip encryption also has 
another benefit. In addition to address obfuscation in 
memory array it helps to protect the firmware in Mask ROM 
from being optically extracted. Without knowing both the 
algorithm and the key an attacker will be unable to make any 
use of the information. 
The strength of the data bus and address bus encryption 
is demonstrated with the example on a particular chip. The 
results presented in this paper show that low-cost 
microprobing attacks can be successfully used to circumvent 
data bus and address bus encryption in embedded Mask 
ROM in a microcontroller with 8-bit CPU core. Challenges 
for 16-bit and 32-bit CPUs are discussed as well. The attack 
was carried out in three steps. The first step was aimed at 
trying to identify the CPU core and gather as much 
information as possible on it. The second step was aimed at 
finding the corresponding encrypted values for specific CPU 
instructions. The third step was used to defeat address bus 
encryption. As these attacks do not require expensive 
equipment they can pose a big problem to the hardware 
community. Without proper countermeasures in place 
security in some devices could be easily compromised. 
Although Mask ROM extraction methods and 
microprobing attacks were described in [1], there are no 
publications on newer devices. The samples chosen for this 
paper are relatively old with 0.35µm fabrication process. The 
main reason for that is to demonstrate the attack process. 
Newer devices can be attacked in a similar way, however, 
more expensive equipment will be required. The main 
contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that a successful 
microprobing attack can be performed on embedded devices 
with encrypted memory. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief 
introduction into embedded memory types and their strength 
against direct extraction from memory array. Section 3 
demonstrates optical extraction of Mask ROM contents from 
smartcard and secure microcontroller. Section 4 shows 
microprobing attack on encrypted Mask ROM storage. 
Section 5 discusses possible implications for modern chips. 
The impact of the research is discussed in the concluding 
section. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Embedded systems are often based on microcontrollers – 
small integrated circuits with SRAM, ROM, EEPROM and 
Flash on a single silicon die. Some modern embedded 
systems are based on System-on-Chip (SoC) devices. Those 
have some additional processors and hardware engines to 
improve functionality and performance. Embedded firmware 
in microcontrollers and SoCs is stored in non-volatile 
memory. For that Mask ROM and Flash memory are usually 
used. Mask ROM is the cheapest storage but it does not 
allow reprogramming, while Flash memory can be 
reprogrammed a few hundred times. When more frequent 
changes are required, for example, for storing variables and 
system parameters, EEPROM is used. It usually allows up to 
a million reprogramming cycles and it can be accessed byte 
wise compared to block erase of Flash memory. Even if the 
main firmware is stored on a separate chip and loaded on 
power-up, there is still some non-volatile storage for 
bootloader. This allows the embedded CPU to boot from that 
trusted internal memory and then perform some security 
checks on the external storage. 
Although some secure microcontrollers and smartcards 
encrypt the embedded memory to prevent microprobing 
attacks, such encryption is usually not cryptographically 
strong. Contrary to that, the external memory storage is 
usually encrypted with strong cryptographic algorithms like 
AES [4] or TDES [5]. There are several reasons why 
embedded storage is less protected. First, access to that 
memory is already a big challenge especially for modern 
deep submicron fabrication processes with more than ten 
metal layers. Second, strong encryption would require 
relatively large hardware support and will result in larger die 
size and, hence, higher production costs. Third, even if a 
very fast hardware crypto-processor is used, it will still 
require 8 bytes for TDES and 16 bytes for AES to be fetched 
from memory. This will introduce additional latency to the 
program execution. External memory is usually loaded into 
on-chip SRAM buffers in large blocks. This allows smoother 
code execution after initial delay. 
Very often the internal memory bus encryption is 
implemented by enforcing XOR operations with some 
predefined blocks or with custom S-Boxes. In order to 
improve the security and prevent cryptanalysis such S-Boxes 
have additional address bus inputs. Ultimate security would 
involve designing a unique S-Box for each valid address of 
the on-chip memory. Not only the firmware or bootloader 
are encrypted but also volatile SRAM memory. This 
prevents microprobing attacks on data and sensitive 
variables. 
Mask ROM can be implemented in different ways. Mask 
ROM usually has NOR or NAND structure according to the 
way transistors are connected inside the memory array [6, 7, 
8]. There is an OR structure as well but the only difference 
between it and the NOR structure is that the transistors are 
connected to VCC instead of VSS. For each structure the 
information is encoded in different ways. The information is 
placed into the ROM during chip fabrication and cannot be 
changed later. 
In NOR ROM with active layer programming, the logic 
state is encoded by the presence or absence of a transistor. 
Information from this type of memory is easily extractable 
under an optical microscope. However for these technologies 
de-processing is required to expose the transistor layer 
covered by the top metal layers which obstruct observation. 
In NOR ROM with contact-layer programming, the 
information is encoded by the presence or absence of via 
plug from bit-line to the active area of a transistor. In old 
memory technologies, these plugs are visible under a 
microscope, but in modern memory technologies with 
planarised layers, de-processing is required to expose the 
plugs. In NOR ROM with programming using ion implants, 
the data is encoded by the threshold level of a transistor. This 
is achieved by creating transistors with different doping 
levels during fabrication. This type of memory provides a 
high level of protection against various kinds of attacks 
because the state of each transistor cannot be observed 
optically even after the de-processing procedure. This type of 
memory is very often used in smartcards to prevent code 
extraction from the memory. More secure chips use NAND 
ROM which offers more compact design, hence, more 
challenging to image them. In NAND ROM with metal layer 
programming, the information is encoded by short-circuiting 
the transistors. This type of memory has a very low level of 
protection against optical observation, as these metal fuses 
are clearly visible under a microscope. Still if the chip has 
more than two metal layers some de-processing is required to 
expose the encoding layer. 
Unlike Mask ROM, which has only two stable logic 
states, EEPROM and Flash memory cells store analog values 
in the form of a charge on the floating gate of a MOS 
transistor. The floating-gate charge shifts the threshold 
voltage of the cell transistor and this is detected with a sense 
amplifier when the cell is read. The maximum charge the 
floating gate can accumulate varies from one technology to 
another and normally is between 103 and 105 electrons.  
EEPROM memory has two transistors – one to select the 
cell and another with floating gate for charge storage. This 
allows the memory to be reprogrammed in bytes and it 
usually has endurance of over a million rewrite cycles. The 
main disadvantage is the size of memory cells which makes 
its use more expensive compared to later introduced Flash 
memory. Flash memory has a simpler structure, faster write 
and access time but unfortunately it cannot be reprogrammed 
in single bytes as it can be erased only in blocks, which is not 
convenient for small data updates. However, some chips 
employ two-transistor Flash cells designs similar to that of 
EEPROM to improve cell characteristics and data retention 
time. 
Flash and EEPROM have many different layouts and 
each semiconductor manufacturer normally has its own 
memory design. Only NOR Flash structure is used as 
embedded memory. From the security point of view all 
floating-gate memories offer very good protection against 
invasive attacks, because the charge injected during 
programming is very small, and buried deeply inside the 
memory cell, so it cannot be detected directly. De-processing 
does not reveal any information – only cell structure. The 
only practical invasive way of extracting the information is 
by microprobing the internal memory bus. This could be 
extremely difficult for modern submicron Flash memories 
which have multiple top metal layers over the data wires. 
There are some direct memory extraction techniques which 
allow direct charge detection with special scanning 
microscopes [9], but they require very expensive equipment 
and sophisticated sample preparation techniques. In addition, 
very long time is required to scan even a medium sized 
memory. As a result such approaches are not considered as a 
threat to modern smartcards and secure microcontrollers 
which widely use Flash and EEPROM memory for sensitive 
data storage. 
The most important tool for invasive attacks is a 
microprobing station. It consists of five elements: a 
microscope, stage, device test socket, micromanipulators and 
probe tips. The microscope must have long working distance 
objectives – sufficient enough to accommodate six to eight 
probe tips between the sample and the objective lens. It 
should also have enough depth of focus to follow the probe 
tip movement. 
For simple applications, a manually controlled probing 
station is enough and can be bought second-hand for less 
than $5,000. Passive probe tips are very cheap (less than $3 
each) but active probes are quite expensive, however, they 
can easily be built from an operational amplifier and a 
passive tip soldered directly to its input [8]. 
Usually to extract the information such as memory 
contents or a secret key, microprobing is applied to the 
internal CPU data bus. It is difficult to observe the whole bus 
at a time in one go and various techniques can be used to 
overcome this. For instance, the same transaction or memory 
read operation can be repeated many times and then two to 
four probes are used to observe the signals which then are 
combined into a complete bus trace. 
In silicon chips, the top-layer aluminum interconnect 
lines are covered by a passivation layer which needs to be 
removed before the probes can establish contact. The most 
convenient and easy-to-use passivation layer removing 
technique involves a laser cutting system. The system 
consists of the laser head mounted on the camera port of a 
microscope and the submicron-precision stage to move the 
sample. Such laser cutters can be bought second-hand for 
several thousand dollars. 
For modern chips with more than three metal layers or 
smaller than 0.35µm process more sophisticated tools such 
as Focused Ion Beam (FIB) workstation has to be used. 
Although such equipment is expensive and require a lot of 
maintenance, these systems are widely used by universities 
across the world in physics, material science and 
engineering. As a result they can be rented for under $100 
per hour rate. 
III. ROM EXTRACTION WITH OPTICAL MICROSCOPE 
Two samples were chosen as a target for Mask ROM 
decryption experiments. One is an old smartcard used in 
banking industry for EMV chip-and-pin transactions from 
2004 to 2008. Another is a custom secure microcontroller 
used in the car industry. 
All the necessary samples were obtained on Ebay, 
however, only a very limited number of smartcard samples 
available. 
No open access documentation is available for those two 
chips. However, the CPU type was possible to guess from 
the manufacturer logo and year of design marked on the 
chip. For the smartcard it was likely to be Hitachi H8/300 
compatible CPU core, while for the microcontroller it was 
likely to be NEC 78K/0 compatible CPU core. Due to the 
lack of any programming specification for these chips it was 
impossible to gain access to the memory via any 
programming or debugging interfaces. That left the only 
option for direct memory extraction using optical 
microscopes. 
 
Figure 1.  Front side image of the smartcard chip 
 
Figure 2.  Front side image of the secure microcontroller chip 
 
The first step in direct memory extraction was to figure 
out the memory type and structure for each chip. To achieve 
this both chips were decapsulated with fuming nitric acid 
using a standard procedure [1]. This allowed estimation of 
 
 
 
 
the fabrication process as well as the type and size of 
embedded memory. 
Both chips were found to be fabricated with 0.35µm 
CMOS process with three metal layers. The smartcard chip 
has 40kB of Mask ROM and 4kB of EEPROM, while 
microcontroller has 32kB of Mask ROM and 256 bytes of 
EEPROM. 
The smartcard chip had some additional security features 
to make hardware attacks harder. The gaps between the 
metal layer lines were reduced to prevent microprobing 
attacks due to the higher chance of short circuiting them. 
Remaining space was filled with some dummy wires 
extended from existing wires and the routing was done with 
multiple jumping between different metal layers to obfuscate 
reverse engineering. 
 
Figure 3.  Mask ROM image of de-processed smartcard chip 
 
Figure 4.  Mask ROM image of  de-processed secure microcontroller chip 
 
The Mask ROM areas of the smartcard photographed 
from the front side is presented in Figure 1, while the same 
area for the secure microcontroller is in Figure 2. In order to 
determine the structure of the Mask ROM both samples were 
de-processed layer by layer down to their transistor layer 
with standard technique for top layers removing [9]. The 
result of this operation for both chips is presented in Figures 
3 and 4. 
No visible information was observed in any of the layers. 
The transistor layer reveal the structure of Mask ROMs for 
the tested chips. For the smartcard it was NOR ion-implanted 
doping encoded ROM and for the microcontroller it was 
NAND ion-implanted doping encoded ROM. 
Although doping encoded Mask ROMs would deter 
many attackers there are still some ways of exposing the 
information using special chemical techniques [9]. In order 
to reveal the information the transistors have to be etched 
with doping dependent etchant. For these chips n-Si selective 
etchant was used. The result of the selective etching for both 
chips is presented in Figures 5 and 6. 
 
Figure 5.  Mask ROM selective etching of the smartcard chip 
 
Figure 6.  Mask ROM selective etching of the secure microcontroller chip 
 
As it can be observed, both memory arrays have clearly 
visible patterns of repeated data. This is a strong indication 
for some encryption or obfuscation being used. The pattern 
comes from address lines being used as an input to block 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
encryption function. As predicted, no useful code was 
extracted from both chips. 
There are two ways such encryption can be defeated. One 
is to reverse engineer the logic placed between Mask ROM 
and CPU. However, given the complex design of this chip 
with ASIC-like sea-of-gates this would require a lot of effort. 
Another approach is to inject data into the bus coming from 
the Mask ROM in order to build a correspondence table 
between the encrypted and plain text data. 
IV. MICROPROBING EXPERIMENTS 
In order to verify the idea of possible Mask ROM 
extraction using microprobing attacks the NEC secure 
microcontroller chip was used. The initial analysis of the 
wires coming to the Mask ROM array revealed that the data 
bus is likely to be multiplexed with eight lower bits of 
address bus. This fact simplified the attack, because the same 
probing needles can be used for observing the result of any 
injected faults into data bus. 
Our microprobing station (Figure 7) allowed maximum 
eight probing needles to be used simultaneously. Therefore, 
some other means of synchronisation to the CPU cycles had 
to be used. The internal activity of the chip was observed 
with a simple power analysis by placing a small resistor into 
the power supply line and monitoring the voltage drop across 
it with an oscilloscope. 
 
Figure 7.  Microprobing setup with eight probing needles on the chip 
 
Special test board was built to accommodate the 
decapsulated chip and run it. The Microchip PIC24HJ128 
microcontroller [10] was used to drive the Reset and Clock 
inputs of the chip. The chip was constantly powered up from 
external 3.3V power supply. The same PIC microcontroller 
was used to monitor the probed lines and to inject required 
signals into them. A simple PC program was written to send 
the commands to the PIC microcontroller via RS-232 
interface and to receive the acquired data. 
In order to establish a contact with internal wires on the 
chip surface the passivation layer needs to be removed above 
the metal wires. For that a laser cutter was used with 100× 
objective lens. For 0.35µm chip it was only practical to 
remove the passivation above top metal layer M3. Therefore, 
all data bus lines were traced to their presence in the top 
metal layer. Probing needles were placed on all eight data 
bus lines using micropositioners of the probing station 
(Figure 8). The view of the chip surface under the probing 
station microscope is presented in Figure 9 with marking of 
the bus bits. 
 
Figure 8.  Microprobing setup with eight probing needles on the chip 
 
Figure 9.  View on the chip surface under microscope 
 
After powering up the microcontroller was run for a short 
period of time by controlling its Reset line. This allowed to 
acquire signals from the data bus lines and correlate them 
with power analysis. It was noticed that after reset the CPU 
 
 
 
 
 
was running from the internal clock generator at 
approximately 150kHz. After approximately 1ms time it was 
switched to running from the external clock. Because the 
internal clock was not very stable it was necessary to adjust 
the timing of the injected signals by monitoring them with an 
oscilloscope. The power analysis observations are presented 
in Figure 10 for the time shortly after the Reset, and in 
Figure 11 after 1ms of the program run. 
 
Figure 10.  Power analysis combined with microprobing 
 
Figure 11.  Power analysis combined with microprobing 
 
The acquired information allowed not only to 
synchronise the signal injection into encrypted data bus, but 
to also separate address and data on the multiplexed bus. The 
first two bytes fetched by CPU correspond to the Reset 
vector. Therefore, any changes to the first byte will 
immediately result in the address set for fetching the first 
instruction. However, the address bus was also encrypted. In 
order to decrypt the address bus the CPU needs to be forced 
into executing non-branching instructions. This could be 
performed by supplying different data for the instruction and 
performing some statistical analysis. Because branch 
instructions represent only 10% of the whole instruction set, 
they can be easily detected by observing non-constant low 
addresses for different input data. 
It was found that the address bus is not actually 
encrypted but simply XORed with a constant. This allowed 
the true plain text data to be extracted for the first byte at 
address 0000h. By injecting data from 00h to FFh into data 
bus for the first byte the corresponding plain text data were 
extracted from subsequent address of the first CPU 
instruction. This allowed to build the S-Box of the 
decryption function which is presented in Appendix. 
The next byte for address 0001h was found by searching 
the encrypted value that corresponds to plain text value of 
00h. This in combination with the first byte decrypted value 
set to 00h resulted in forcing the CPU to subsequently 
execute the first instruction at address 0000h. Because the S-
Box for that address was known it allowed setting the first 
byte to be a branch instruction followed by low address value 
in the next byte at address 0001h. That way it was possible to 
extract the S-Box decryption table for address 0001h and it is 
presented in Appendix. In the similar way by forcing the 
CPU to fetch branch instructions the S-Boxes for addresses 
0002h and 0003h were extracted. This allowed execution of 
a simple code of MOV A,!addr16 instruction to fetch data 
from memory followed by BR AX instruction to put the data 
on the address bus [11]. As a result the whole memory space 
of the microcontroller was successfully extracted. 
V. DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The presented microprobing attack is the ultimate 
implementation of fault injection attack with full control over 
internal data bus lines. Although the theoretical strength of 
address bus encryption for 32kB ROM could be as high as 
215! ≈  9.09· 10133733, in reality this can be cracked 
relatively easy. This is due to the fact that all CPU programs 
are executed sequentially. Therefore, a correspondence table 
for sequential addresses can be reconstructed in a relatively 
short time. 
Data bus encryption offer very good protection unless an 
attacker can inject arbitrary data into the data bus. This way 
he can force the CPU to execute a branch instruction which 
will map the input of encrypted data into plain text data 
appearing on the internal address bus. Even if the ROM 
address bus is encrypted it can be defeated in the way 
discussed above. Theoretical strength of the data bus 
encryption for 8-bit bus is 28! ≈ 8.58·10506 multiplied by 
the number of bytes. However, CPU execution flow could 
significantly reduce its strength. 
From the extracted correspondence table between cipher 
text and plain text or S-Boxes for the first two bytes of the 
memory space one can clearly see their weakness (Tables I 
and II). Each table can be simplified to an XOR function. 
That is XOR B6 for address 0000h and XOR 3D for 0001h. 
This significantly reduces the strength of the encryption. In 
fact the actual implementation is likely done with using a 
XOR function with a constant derived from address. This 
was likely achieved by using a fixed function of address lines 
fed into the XOR block on the data bus. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE I.  S-BOX TABLE FOR ADDRESS 0000 
Plain 
text 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
0x B6 B7 B4 B5 B2 B3 B0 B1 BE BF BC BD BA BB B8 B9 
1x A6 A7 A4 A5 A2 A3 A0 A1 AE AF AC AD AA AB A8 A9 
2x 96 97 94 95 92 93 90 91 9E 9F 9C 9D 9A 9B 98 99 
3x 86 87 84 85 82 83 80 81 8E 8F 8C 8D 8A 8B 88 89 
4x F6 F7 F4 F5 F2 F3 F0 F1 FE FF FC FD FA FB F8 F9 
5x E6 E7 E4 E5 E2 E3 E0 E1 EE EF EC ED EA EB E8 E9 
6x D6 D7 D4 D5 D2 D3 D0 D1 DE DF DC DD DA DB D8 D9 
7x C6 C7 C4 C5 C2 C3 C0 C1 CE CF CC CD CA CB C8 C9 
8x 36 37 34 35 32 33 30 31 3E 3F 3C 3D 3A 3B 38 39 
9x 26 27 24 25 22 23 20 21 2E 2F 2C 2D 2A 2B 28 29 
Ax 16 17 14 15 12 13 10 11 1E 1F 1C 1D 1A 1B 18 19 
Bx 06 07 04 05 02 03 00 01 0E 0F 0C 0D 0A 0B 08 09 
Cx 76 77 74 75 72 73 70 71 7E 7F 7C 7D 7A 7B 78 79 
Dx 66 67 64 65 62 63 60 61 6E 6F 6C 6D 6A 6B 68 69 
Ex 56 57 54 55 52 53 50 51 5E 5F 5C 5D 5A 5B 58 59 
Fx 46 47 44 45 42 43 40 41 4E 4F 4C 4D 4A 4B 48 49 
 
TABLE II.  S-BOX TABLE FOR ADDRESS 0001 
Plain 
text 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
0x 3D 3C 3F 3E 39 38 3B 3A 35 34 37 36 31 30 33 32 
1x 2D 2C 2F 2E 29 28 2B 2A 25 24 27 26 21 20 23 22 
2x 1D 1C 1F 1E 19 18 1B 1A 15 14 17 16 11 10 13 12 
3x 0D 0C 0F 0E 09 08 0B 0A 05 04 07 06 01 00 03 02 
4x 7D 7C 7F 7E 79 78 7B 7A 75 74 77 76 71 70 73 72 
5x 6D 6C 6F 6E 69 68 6B 6A 65 64 67 66 61 60 63 62 
6x 5D 5C 5F 5E 59 58 5B 5A 55 54 57 56 51 50 53 52 
7x 4D 4C 4F 4E 49 48 4B 4A 45 44 47 46 41 40 43 42 
8x BD BC BF BE B9 B8 BB BA B5 B4 B7 B6 B1 B0 B3 B2 
9x AD AC AF AE A9 A8 AB AA A5 A4 A7 A6 A1 A0 A3 A2 
Ax 9D 9C 9F 9E 99 98 9B 9A 95 94 97 96 91 90 93 92 
Bx 8D 8C 8F 8E 89 88 8B 8A 85 84 87 86 81 80 83 82 
Cx FD FC FF FE F9 F8 FB FA F5 F4 F7 F6 F1 F0 F3 F2 
Dx ED EC EF EE E9 E8 EB EA E5 E4 E7 E6 E1 E0 E3 E2 
Ex DD DC DF DE D9 D8 DB DA D5 D4 D7 D6 D1 D0 D3 D2 
Fx CD CC CF CE C9 C8 CB CA C5 C4 C7 C6 C1 C0 C3 C2 
 
The results for data extraction were achieved on 8-bit 
CPU with multiplexed address and data bus. There will be 
obvious implications for 16-bit or 32-bit CPUs with separate 
buses. However, on practice the address bus can be probed 
with a single probe one wire at a time. The necessity for the 
control of all 16 or 32 bits at a time will be dictated by the 
implementation of the cryptographic function. If like with 
our case of address dependent XOR functions, those CPUs 
will use independent 8-bit S-Boxes there will be no need for 
full control as each byte will influence different address 
lines. 
On the countermeasures side it is obvious that a stronger 
cryptographic algorithm applied to wider data bus will be 
much harder to break. However, such algorithms require a 
lot of computational power and are not suitable for small 
microcontrollers and smartcards. Still there could be found a 
compromise between simplicity of S-Boxes and high latency 
of proper encryption algorithms. 
The results presented in this paper were based on mid-
range 8-bit and 16-bit microcontrollers fabricated with 
0.35µm process. Devices with smaller topology will likely 
require more sophisticated tools, such as Focused Ion Beam 
(FIB) machines to establish the connections to the memory 
bus. This will inevitable increase the cost of the attack and 
deter many attackers. But still the vulnerability of a weak 
encryption cannot be ignored. 
Further work could involve experimenting with 16-bit 
secure microcontrollers with encrypted on-chip memory. 
However, given their likely fabrication process of being 
180nm or 130nm this will inevitably require the use of a FIB 
machine. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The research presented in this paper showed that 
embedded memory encryption on its own does not provide 
absolute protection against eavesdropping and direct fault 
injection into data bus. Whenever a CPU is involved in 
memory access the security of encrypted data is under threat. 
This is caused by the fact that many CPU instructions leak 
data on the address bus. Although many secure chips employ 
address bus encryption this is usually even easier to break 
than data bus encryption. By design most CPUs execute 
sequential code thus leaking all the necessary information 
needed to reconstruct unencrypted address values. 
This paper presents an affordable and practical approach 
to program code extraction from the encrypted on-chip Mask 
ROM storage in a secure microcontroller. The CPU is a big 
threat in embedded and SoC devices. Not only it leaks a lot 
of side-channel information during the code execution [12], 
but it could also pass decrypted data to address bus or leak it 
through conditional actions. 
Although it was performed on a chip fabricated with 
0.35µm process it shows the way of defeating the data bus 
and address bus encryption. Because the attack allows full S-
Box extraction there is no difference whether the encryption 
was cryptographically strong or not. The ability to run an 
arbitrary code on the CPU would in the end allow full 
control with the whole memory extraction. For 16-bit and 
32-bit CPUs the attack will not only take longer to perform 
because of the larger number of possible combinations. It 
would also require full control of the data bus which is not 
possible with low-cost manual probing stations like the one 
used for these experiments. 
More robust testing and evaluation must be performed on 
semiconductor devices going into sensitive and secure 
applications with high risk factors like in banking, car, 
aviation and medical industries as well as critical 
infrastructure. Not only a strong encryption must be used, 
but also integrity check of the code being executed. 
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